www.eliamep.gr/en/eliamep-thesis/
Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis
Assistant Professor
at the Department of Political Science, Bilkent University and Research Fellow
at ELIAMEP
ioannis@eliamep.gr
Summary
The
present paper examines the challenges that Turkish foreign policy has faced in
the Middle East following the outbreak of the
uprisings that have been collectively called “the Arab Spring.” It is argued
that Turkish foreign policy has failed to play in the Middle
East the pivotal role the “Davutoğlu Doctrine” had envisioned.
Mounting problems in the Kurdish question and accusations of sectarianism in
foreign policy have contributed to a decline of Turkey’s
soft power in the Middle East, which was
painstakingly accumulated after years of political reform and stellar economic
performance. Instead of becoming a crisis mediator, Turkey
may end up entangled in the Middle East
imbroglio
It was less than
two years ago that Turkey’s
star in the Middle East appeared to be on a
steady rise. Turkey’s
stellar economic performance and democratization steps in the last decade
garnered appreciation across the globe. Particularly attracted to the Turkish
achievements was the Middle East. Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
enjoyed spectacular popularity rates in the Arab public opinion, while his
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu advocated a “zero-problems policy with
neighbours” and argued in favour of Turkey’s “order-constituting” role
in the region. Nevertheless, following the outbreak of the series of uprisings
that came to be called the “Arab Spring,” Turkey’s ability to lead the region
or even improve its strategic weight has been questioned. Relations with
countries like Iran, Iraq and Syria
have become increasingly strained, while Turkey has been accused of taking
an increasingly sectarian approach to regional conflicts. Developments on the
domestic front have not been forthcoming, either. The lack of a lasting
democratic solution to Turkey’s own Kurdish issue and renewed escalation of PKK
violence have brought to the fore Turkey’s own shortcomings in addressing
minority rights and ethnic diversity, key issues in the context of the “Arab
Spring” and democratic transition in the Middle East. Under these circumstances,
Turkey’s
soft power and potential to contribute to conflict resolution in the region
appear curtailed. In particular, Turkey’s growing involvement in the
Syrian crisis has exposed it to unprecedented risks both regarding its regional
status as well as its domestic stability.
Relations with countries
like Iran, Iraq and Syria
have become increasingly strained, while Turkey has been accused of taking
an increasingly sectarian approach to regional conflicts.
Whither
The “Davutoğlu Doctrine”
According to what
came to be known as “Davutoğlu Doctrine,” Turkey was more than a “bridge”
between the West and the Muslim world; it was a “central power.” It professed
multiple regional identities and was bound to develop a “multidimensional,
proactive foreign policy commensurate to its historic and geographic
significance, underwritten by its Ottoman legacy.” Resolving Turkey’s
bilateral problems with its neighbours would unlock its
ELIAMEP Thesis Oct. 2012 3/2012 [p.02] "The
'Davutoğlu Doctrine' under Pressure:
unrealized
strategic potential. In his own words, Turkey enjoys multiple regional
identities and thus has the capability as well as the responsibility to follow
an integrated and multidimensional foreign policy. The unique combination of
our history and geography brings with it a sense of responsibility. To
contribute actively towards conflict resolution and international peace and
security in all these areas is a call of duty arising from the depths of a
multidimensional history for Turkey[1]
Turkey’s rising role could be
viewed in the context of the surging global influence of emerging economies.
Accusing
the West of double standards when dealing with international conflict in the
Middle East and elsewhere, Erdoğan
claimed that Turkey
would bring a higher moral standard to global governance and politics.
Turkey’s rising role could be viewed in
the context of the surging global influence of emerging economies. These have
been referred to with the acronym BRIC, namely Brazil,
Russia, India and China. As a “second-tier BRIC
state,” Turkey
has enjoyed a stellar economic performance, which was linked to a sharp rise of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), single-digit
inflation and growing trust in the national currency. These achievements
underwrote its ambitions for a key regional and emerging global role, in line
with the concomitant reconfiguration of strategic and diplomatic balances.
The
political underpinnings of this success were also not negligible. In the early
2000s, Turkey
went a long way into improving its democratic record and bringing its Kurdish
question close to a solution. This improved both its appeal in the region as
well as its self-confidence. Finding a balance in the “democracy vs. security”
dilemma that has haunted policy analysts in the Middle East allowed Turkey to
appear as a model state in the region and source of inspiration for Arab
reformists.
Meanwhile,
the normative aspect of Turkish foreign policy was thought to make a big
difference. Accusing the West of double standards when dealing with
international conflict in the Middle East and elsewhere, Erdoğan claimed that Turkey would
bring a higher moral standard to global governance and politics and achieve a
harmony of Realpolitik and norms-based foreign policy. He also enjoyed
appearing as the defender of the dispossessed and the oppressed in the Middle East and beyond. In his words:
The
communities that perceive themselves as the crushed, worn, propelled,
victimized, and downtrodden, and the communities that have no belief in justice
and sincerity, make it impossible to establish peace and stability on a global
scale. This is what we have emphasized in our foreign policy. We defend
justice, peace, law, and democracy in every area. We, as a conservative and
democratic party, are struggling to hold both real and normative policy
together [2]
What
would be the endgame? The stated aim was to turn Turkey
into one of the ten biggest economies in the world by the year 2023, which is
the centennial of the Republic
of Turkey. In Davutoğlu’s
words,
By 2023
when the country will commemorate the 100th anniversary of the foundation of
the republic, I envision a Turkey which is a full member of the EU after having
completed all the necessary requirements, living in full peace with its neighbours,
integrated with neighbouring basins in economic terms and for a common security
vision, an effective player in setting orders in regions where our national
interests lie, and active in all global affairs and among the top ten economies
in the world [3]
This
historic moment provided a rare opportunity for the realization of the promises
set out by the “Davutoğlu
Doctrine.”
The
“Arab Spring” Litmus Test
Ever
since the self-immolation of a Tunisian
street vendor on 17 December 2010 resulted in the
series of uprisings throughout the Arab world that were collectively called the
“Arab Spring,” seemingly impeccable authoritarian regimes have started
crumbling. This historic moment provided a rare opportunity for the realization
of the promises set out by the “Davutoğlu Doctrine.” Turkey could prove its
leadership claims in the Middle East, at a time leadership was more necessary
than ever, and act as a catalyst in democratic transition in the region least
affected by previous democratization waves. Nevertheless, its record has
hitherto proven rather mixed. Relations with key states in the Middle East have
sharply deteriorated, while Turkey
has been accused of taking sides on sectarian grounds in regional conflicts
rather than promoting peace, conflict resolution and democratic transition.
Nevertheless,
its record has hitherto proven rather mixed.
Turkey and the Arab Spring-Official Views
Turkey’s official policy towards the “Arab
Spring” has been outlined in a recent paper, authored by Foreign Minister
Davutoğlu himself. This was said to consist of the following building blocks [4]
a.
“Support for the people who rise to demand such basic human rights”
This
appeared to be in line with the new normative dimension in Turkish foreign
policy which aimed not to sacrifice human rights or justice for Realpolitik interests.
b.
“Emphasis on the fact that transition towards stable and legitimate democratic
political structures can only be achieved via a balance between security and
freedom”
Turkey
appeared thus to seek a fine balance between its interest in regional stability
and security and the need to address the reality that regime change in the
Middle East could be realized even through violent means.
c.
“No contradiction between emphasis on democratic demands, which in some cases
required confronting repressive regimes and foreign policy principle of zero
problems with neighbours”
In this
rather ambitious statement, Davutoğlu claimed that Turkey could maintain
friendly relations with its neighbouring states while simultaneously promoting
regime change in some of them.
d.
“Opposition to foreign intervention because this region’s future has to be
decided by its people”
In view
of this, Turkey
categorically opposed direct or indirect interventions by Western or other
actors which could have a catalytic effect on the outcome of the Arab Spring
e.
“All people of the region are Turkey’s
“eternal brothers” irrespective of their background and saw it our duty to
dampen sectarian tensions”
This was
a clear pledge about Turkey
opposition to sectarian politics and commitment to support the peaceful
coexistence of diverse religious and ethnic groups in the Middle
East. While these bold statements set a rather high bar for
Turkish foreign policy, their operationalization has not always been
successful.
;
Turkey appeared to fall into inconsistencies
which underlined that Realpolitik was Turkey’s main compass in the “Arab
Spring,” despite lofty statements to the opposite.
The Early Phase of the Arab Spring
Turkey was caught by surprise when the
“Arab Spring” broke out and was not alone in that. While regime change in Tunisia proved easier than expected, the course
of events in Libya and Egypt was
different. Turkey had strong
economic interests in Libya
and was apprehensive of regime change. Initially it opposed any foreign
intervention, which appeared to imply continued support for the Qaddafi regime.
Nonetheless, the Turkish government gradually aligned its position with Western
states and withdrew its support for the Qaddafi regime. An attack by a Libyan
mob on the Turkish Consulate in Benghazi in
April 2011 indicated that Turkey’s
position was becoming increasingly unpopular and unsustainable. Meanwhile, Turkey’s
reaction to the Egyptian uprising was equivocal. Taking a firm position against
the Mubarak regime and promoting regime change took some time given concerns
that a new Egyptian regime might attempt to challenge Turkey’s
regional influence. In the case of Bahrain,
Turkey opted not to clash
with Saudi determination to quell an uprising that threatened to move the
country away from the bloc of Sunni Gulf monarchies and bring it closer to Iran. Such
moves were understandable given Turkey’s
regional interests and security concerns. Yet they were in disharmony with the
normative role that Turkey
aspired to play in regional and global politics. Turkey
appeared to fall into inconsistencies which underlined that Realpolitik was
Turkey’s
main compass in the “Arab Spring,” despite lofty statements to the opposite [5]
5
While irrelevant to the “Arab Spring”, Turkey’s
consistent support for the al-Bashir regime in Sudan,
despite the International Criminal Court prosecution of the Sudanese president
due to genocide crimes committed in Darfur, is
another contradiction to the high moral standards set by the Turkish
government.
Relations with Iran
Turkey’s relations with Iran have been a key contention point in its
relations with the West, in particular with reference to Iran’s nuclear
program. Turkey and Brazil took
distance from
the United States
and other Western states on the question of Iranian nuclear ambitions. In May
2010, they brokered an abortive “compromise agreement” voted against UN
Security Council resolution regarding the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.
The compromise deal was hailed by the Turkish Prime Minister and the Brazilian
President Lula as a turning point. Yet they failed to convince the rest of the
members of the UN Security Council. Its resolution, taken against the
dissenting votes of Brazil
and Turkey, raised
speculation regarding Turkey’s
alignment with the West and the degree of its closeness to Iran. Following
that highpoint, Iranian-Turkish relations have significantly cooled, and this
trend has accelerated following the outbreak of the Arab Spring. Turkey and Iran
found themselves on opposite sides in key confrontations, most importantly in Syria. While Turkey sided with opposition forces, Iran remained
the single most important sponsor of the Assad regime. As the crisis went on, Iran
intensified its support for the Assad regime and turned its survival into a
primary objective of its foreign policy. Meanwhile, after long hesitations, Turkey agreed in September 2011 to the
installation of a NATO anti-ballistic missile defense system against a
potential Iranian attack near the eastern city of Malatya. Turkey’s decision to allow this
installation manifested the degree of alienation in bilateral relations. Mutual
accusations of interference in Syrian domestic affairs in the context of the
escalating Syrian civil war only added more tension to an already strained
relationship. The possibility of an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities posed a formidable
challenge to Turkey’s
Middle Eastern policy.
The Syrian Imbroglio
Until the outbreak
of the Syrian uprising in January 2011, Syrian-Turkish relations appeared to be
the best example of the “zero problems with neighbours” policy. While the two
countries had come to the brink of war in 1998, they later developed an ever
closer economic and diplomatic relationship. Nevertheless, following the
failure of Turkey’s
repeated attempts to mediate a compromise solution in the Syrian uprising,
relations deteriorated sharply. Turkey
turned into a key supporter for Syrian opposition forces which found safe haven
in its adjacent to the Syrian border territory. In July 2012, Syrian forces
shot down a Turkish aircraft offshore the Eastern
Mediterranean coast under disputed conditions which indicated how
damaged bilateral relations were. In September 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan
came to the point of calling Syria
a “terrorist state” and comparing what has happened in Syria with what happened in Kerbela,
a direct reference to the bitter battle that sealed the division of the Muslim
world into Sunni and Shiite. In October 2012, a Syrian shell hit the Turkish
border town of Akçakale
killing five civilians and provoking Turkish retaliatory strikes, as well as a
decision of the Turkish Parliament to authorize military action beyond the
Turkish borders.
Turkey’s increasing convergence with
states such as Saudi Arabia
and Qatar as far as its
handling of the Syrian crisis was concerned, questioned its commitment to democratic
transition and respect for human rights in post-Assad Syria.
Relations
with the Nuri al-Maliki government in Baghdad
have turned increasingly sour in recent months, and Turkey
has been accused of meddling in the domestic affairs of Iraq.
Nevertheless,
developments have pointed toward the intrinsic nature of the Syrian conflict.
The Assad regime did not quickly collapse as the Qaddafi one and was able to
attract considerable support from a segment of the Syrian population. As the
uprising was turning into an open civil war, Turkey was accused of getting
involved in sectarian activities through its support for the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood. Turkey’s
increasing convergence with states such as Saudi
Arabia and Qatar
as far as its handling of the Syrian crisis was concerned, questioned its
commitment to democratic transition and respect for human rights in post-Assad Syria. It also
reinforced the views of those who argued that Turkey drifted towards a sectarian
policy and supported the emergence of a Sunni Islamist regime. Moreover, the
tactical retreat of Syrian government forces from the northeast of the country
also allowed local Kurdish groups affiliated with the PKK to claim control.
This appeared a shock to many in Turkey,
as it appeared that Kurdish nationalists were benefiting from the havoc wrought
in Syria
by civil war. As there was no clear end in sight in the Syrian crisis, Turkey was
increasingly seen as a party in the Syrian conflict rather than a part of a
solution.
Relations with Iraq
Turkey’s relations with post-Saddam
Hussein Iraq
were inevitably affected by the March 2003 surprise decision of the Turkish
Parliament not to allow the use of Turkish territory by invading US troops. Turkey ended up without any significant military
presence and influence in post-war Iraq
and became increasingly apprehensive of any developments that led to rising
legitimacy of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq. While
eventually relations with Iraqi Kurds and the KRG substantially improved, those
with the Baghdad Shiite-controlled government deteriorated. Turkey was viewed as promoting sectarianism and
decentralization in Iraq
by promoting Sunni political parties and the KRG. Relations with the Nuri
al-Maliki government in Baghdad have turned
increasingly sour in recent months, and Turkey
has been accused of meddling in the domestic affairs of Iraq. Turkey appeared
to intervene in Iraqi domestic affairs even taking the side of the KRG against
the Shiite administration in such critical issues such as oil export and
internal borders. The August 2012 visit of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu to
Northern Iraq and the city of Kirkuk, a city
whose status remains disputed and has been claimed by the KRG and the federal
government in Iraq
has added more tension. Accusations of involvement in Iraqi domestic affairs
were amplified with the flight of the Sunni former Iraqi Prime Minister
al-Hashimi to Turkey
in April 2012, following accusations of having organized death squads to foment
sectarian violence. While al-Hashimi was tried in absentia in Iraq and was sentenced to death in September
2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan declared his determination to provide al-Hashimi
safe haven in Turkey.
This added one
more
obstacle to the already difficult relations between Iraq
and Turkey.
The perception that Erdoğan’s decision to back al-Hashimi was influenced by
their common Sunni faith remained strong both in Iraq
and Turkey.
The “Achilles Heel” of the Kurdish Issue
While
“Arab Spring” developments often posed challenges to Turkish foreign policy, a
key problem re-emerged within the Turkish borders. The escalation of the Kurdish
conflict threatened a key precondition set by the “Davutoğlu Doctrine” for the
realization of Turkey’s
strategic potential and questioned one of the biggest successes of the AKP
administration. In the first years of its administration, the AKP had played a
key role in promoting recognition of Kurdish rights and introducing a conflict
resolution process. These peaked in November 2009, when thirty-four PKK members
were allowed to return to Turkey,
following an agreement with the government. This was the most courageous
attempt by the Turkish government to promote reconciliation and possible
amnesty for PKK members who would be willing to give up violence and return to
their ordinary lives.
While
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu stood
for the compatibility of its support for regime change with the “zero problems
with neighbours” policy, one cannot ignore the sharp deterioration in Turkey’s relations with all its Middle Eastern
neighbours, Syria, Iraq and Iran.
Yet the
reaction of Turkish public opinion against the images of triumphant Kurdish
celebrations during the repatriation of the PKK militants led to a government
U-turn. Returnees were eventually arrested, while state pressure on Kurdish and
pro-Kurdish political activists increased. Hundreds of Kurdish local leaders
and intellectuals were prosecuted according to anti-terrorism legislation for
being members of the Union of Communities in Kurdistan
(Koma Civakên Kurdistan-KCK) and were detained for months before
standing for trial. The pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik
Toplum Partisi-DTP) was closed following a decision of the Constitutional Court,
while requests for primary education in Kurdish and decentralization expressed by
its successor Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi-BDP)
have met with the opposition of the Turkish government. Kurdish political
activists requested bilingual state primary education in the Kurdish-inhabited
provinces of Turkey.
While Prime Minister Erdoğan requested the same right for Turkish immigrants in
Germany
and warned against the threat of assimilation, he appeared unwilling to grant
this right to his own citizens of Kurdish descent. Eventually the key elements
of the “democratic opening” were abandoned and replaced by a policy that
undermined conflict resolution steps and favored a security-based approach of
the Kurdish issue. The toll of this policy shift has been dismal: More than 750
people were killed in clashes between Turkish government forces and the PKK
within the last fifteen months. The escalation of PKK violence and state
operations is reminiscent of the pre-AKP period which has been remembered as
one of the most violent and bloody periods in republican Turkish history.
Conclusions
Turkish foreign
policy in the Middle East has faced formidable
challenges since the outset of the “Arab Spring.” Its support for “Arab Spring”
revolts has not been unequivocal, and in some cases, it took long before Turkey switched
from cautious regime support to outright support for the opposition. In other
cases such as in Bahrain, Turkey remained
silent until the final suppression of the uprising. While Foreign Minister
Davutoğlu stood for the compatibility of its support for regime change with the
“zero problems with neighbours” policy, one cannot ignore the sharp
deterioration in Turkey’s
relations with all its Middle Eastern neighbours, Syria,
Iraq and Iran. While
opposition to external intervention was coined as a key principle of Turkey’s “Arab Spring” policy, Turkey itself joined –albeit late– the NATO camp
in Libya
and has actively supported the armed insurgency of Syrian opposition. Finally,
as far as Turkey’s cordial
relations with all ethnic and religious groups in the Middle East were
concerned, this was also a hard position to defend: Turkey has been increasingly
perceived as a supporter for Sunni political actors in the region. It has also
been accused of taking a sectarian shift in its foreign policy and allying with
non-democratic forces. Recent comparisons between Syria
and Kerbela made by Prime Minister Erdoğan
have reinforced such allegations. These have taken a toll on the country’s soft
power, which was painstakingly accumulated after years of political reform and
starring economic performance.
In view
of these, Turkey’s
ambition to play a major independent role has been compromised. Instead, Turkey has appeared more willing to seek common
understanding with Western states and with the United States in particular. This
entertains the opportunity of a rehabilitation of Turkish foreign policy within
the Western strategic environment. On the other hand, relations with Iran maintain a strong deterioration potential
given the uncertain outcome of the Syrian civil war in which Turkey and Iran have held opposite sides, as
well as the Iranian nuclear question. In addition, the deterioration of the
Kurdish issue has become a serious check to the country’s soft power potential.
Renewed emphasis on the Kurdish issue with the aim to resuscitate the peace
process appears crucial. Recognizing Kurdish cultural rights, similar to those Turkey demands
from the German government for its own immigrants, would be a useful starting
point. Otherwise, instead of becoming a crisis mediator and stability factor, Turkey may end up in the rather unhappy position
of importing instability and insecurity from the Middle
East.
1 Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkish Foreign Policy and
the EU in 2010", Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 8, no. 3 (2009), p. 12
2 Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, "The Changing Balances and the Rising Importance of Turkey", Paper presented at the Lecture
delivered at the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) (Ankara, 3/2/2010)
3 Abdullah Bozkurt,
"Davutoğlu Sees Turkey
among Top 10 World Players by 2023", Today's Zaman, 5/1/2010
4 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Principles
of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring [Center for
Strategic Research, Vision Paper No. 3] (Ankara:
SAM, 2012), pp. 7-8
5 While irrelevant to the “Arab Spring”, Turkey’s consistent support for the al-Bashir
regime in Sudan, despite the
International Criminal Court prosecution of the Sudanese president due to
genocide crimes committed in Darfur, is
another contradiction to the high moral standards set by the Turkish
government.
Bibliography
Abdullah
Bozkurt, "Davutoğlu Sees Turkey
among Top 10 World Players by 2023", Today's Zaman, 5/1/2010
Ahmet
Davutoğlu, Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political
Structuring [Center for Strategic Research, Vision Paper No. 3] (Ankara: SAM, 2012)
———,
"Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010", Turkish Policy
Quarterly, Vol. 8, no. 3 (2009), pp. 11-17
Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, "The Changing Balances and the Rising Importance of
Turkey", Paper presented at the Lecture delivered at the International
Strategic Research Organization (USAK) (Ankara, 3/2/2010)
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